GitHub Advisoryadvisory · PyPI

GHSA-whvh-wf3x-g77j JupyterLab: Allowlist/blocklist check in `PyPIExtensionManager.install()` not enforced for direct callers (missing `await`)

LOW Published 2026-07-22 Modified 2026-07-22 Official page ↗
Ecosystem
PyPI
Packages
jupyterlab
Severity
Low
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N
Weaknesses
CWE-284, CWE-636
Reviewed
2026-07-22

Affected packages

• PyPI jupyterlab: >= 4.6.0, < 4.6.2 → fixed in 4.6.2 • PyPI jupyterlab: < 4.5.10 → fixed in 4.5.10

Description

The extension allowlist/blocklist check inside `PyPIExtensionManager.install()` was not enforced due to a missing await. For purposes of JupyterLab this was a secondary defense-in-depth check: `install()` was intended to enforce the allowlist/blocklist itself for any future uses and users calling this method directly (in addition to the separate check handling requests arriving through the HTTP API). The only runtime symptom was a `RuntimeWarning: coroutine 'is_install_allowed' was never awaited.` This has security implications only for deployments that combine all of the following: • a custom extension or downstream integration that imports `PyPIExtensionManager` and calls `install()` directly with a package name influenced by untrusted user input (the stock JupyterLab HTTP handler is not affected - it performs its own awaited allowlist check before calling `install()`); • an allowlist/blocklist configured with the intent of restricting which packages users can install; • the (default) PyPI Extension Manager enabled; and • kernels and terminals disabled or delegated to remote hosts, so that the custom extension's `install()` call is the only available package-install vector (otherwise a user with kernel access can install packages directly regardless of this check) Impact Low. No exposure for stock JupyterLab: the HTTP API and Extension Manager UI enforce the listing through a separate, correctly awaited check. The gap affected only custom extensions or downstream integrations that called the public `install()` method directly and relied on it to self-enforce. Patches JupyterLab `v4.6.2` and `v4.5.10` contain the patch. Users of applications that depend on JupyterLab, such as Notebook v7+, should update `jupyterlab` package too. Workarounds No action is required for deployments that only expose extension management through the JupyterLab HTTP API / Extension Manager UI, as that path was already enforcing the listing via the handler's own check. Deployments wanting to disable programmatic extension installation entirely can switch to the read-only extension manager: ```bash --LabApp.extension_manager=readonly ``` or the following traitlet: ```python c.LabApp.extension_manager = 'readonly' ``` You can confirm that the read-only manager is in use from GUI:

Related

Weakness · CWE (2)

  • CWE-284 Improper Access Control weakness
  • CWE-636 Not Failing Securely weakness

References