GitHub Advisoryadvisory · PyPI
GHSA-whvh-wf3x-g77j JupyterLab: Allowlist/blocklist check in `PyPIExtensionManager.install()` not enforced for direct callers (missing `await`)
LOW
Official page ↗
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Packages
- jupyterlab
- Severity
- Low
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-284, CWE-636
- Reviewed
- 2026-07-22
Affected packages
• PyPI jupyterlab: >= 4.6.0, < 4.6.2 → fixed in 4.6.2
• PyPI jupyterlab: < 4.5.10 → fixed in 4.5.10
Description
The extension allowlist/blocklist check inside `PyPIExtensionManager.install()` was not enforced due to a missing await. For purposes of JupyterLab this was a secondary defense-in-depth check: `install()` was intended to enforce the allowlist/blocklist itself for any future uses and users calling this method directly (in addition to the separate check handling requests arriving through the HTTP API). The only runtime symptom was a `RuntimeWarning: coroutine 'is_install_allowed' was never awaited.`
This has security implications only for deployments that combine all of the following:
• a custom extension or downstream integration that imports `PyPIExtensionManager` and calls `install()` directly with a package name influenced by untrusted user input (the stock JupyterLab HTTP handler is not affected - it performs its own awaited allowlist check before calling `install()`);
• an allowlist/blocklist configured with the intent of restricting which packages users can install;
• the (default) PyPI Extension Manager enabled; and
• kernels and terminals disabled or delegated to remote hosts, so that the custom extension's `install()` call is the only available package-install vector (otherwise a user with kernel access can install packages directly regardless of this check)
Impact
Low. No exposure for stock JupyterLab: the HTTP API and Extension Manager UI enforce the listing through a separate, correctly awaited check. The gap affected only custom extensions or downstream integrations that called the public `install()` method directly and relied on it to self-enforce.
Patches
JupyterLab `v4.6.2` and `v4.5.10` contain the patch.
Users of applications that depend on JupyterLab, such as Notebook v7+, should update `jupyterlab` package too.
Workarounds
No action is required for deployments that only expose extension management through the JupyterLab HTTP API / Extension Manager UI, as that path was already enforcing the listing via the handler's own check. Deployments wanting to disable programmatic extension installation entirely can switch to the read-only extension manager:
```bash
--LabApp.extension_manager=readonly
```
or the following traitlet:
```python
c.LabApp.extension_manager = 'readonly'
```
You can confirm that the read-only manager is in use from GUI:
Related
References
- https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/security/advisories/GHSA-whvh-wf3x-g77j web
- https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/pull/19184 web
- https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/pull/19185 web
- https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/pull/19186 web
- https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/commit/be9303f5bcd5308eaeae953c5a3c903046682c2c web
- https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/commit/f1beab4a2027af4719d6edc07d52d6cf5a39a432 web
- https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab package
- https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/releases/tag/v4.5.10 web
- https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/releases/tag/v4.6.2 web