GHSA-wrvw-254r-wpmv CliInvoke.Specializations has command injection in PowerShell and Cmd shell wrappers

• NuGet CliInvoke.Specializations: >= 2.2.0, < 2.8.5 → fixed in 2.8.5 • NuGet CliInvoke.Specializations: >= 2.9.0, < 2.9.4 → fixed in 2.9.4 • NuGet CliInvoke.Specializations: >= 2.10.0, < 2.10.5 → fixed in 2.10.5 • NuGet CliInvoke.Specializations: >= 3.0.0-alpha.1, < 3.0.0-beta.1 → fixed in 3.0.0-beta.1 • NuGet CliInvoke.Specializations: >= 3.0.0-alpha.8, < 3.0.0-beta.1 → fixed in 3.0.0-beta.1 • NuGet AlastairLundy.CliInvoke.Specializations: >= 1.0.0-rc.1, < 2.0.2 → fixed in 2.0.2

Impact An OS command injection vulnerability exists in the PowerShell and Cmd shell wrappers provided by the `CliInvoke.Specializations` package (the `PowershellProcessInvoker`/`CmdProcessInvoker` invokers, and the `UsePowerShell`/`UseCmd` middleware in v3 pre-release versions). The wrappers re-run a caller-supplied target and arguments inside a shell command (`pwsh -Command ...` / `cmd /c ...`). In affected versions the wrapped command was delivered to the operating system as a single `ProcessStartInfo.Arguments` string. The OS command-line parser re-tokenizes that string before the shell parses it, so a double quote (`"`) in the target or arguments breaks OS-level quoting and lets the wrapped shell reassemble a second, unintended command. An attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the host process. Patches The Specializations Packages now deliver the command via `ProcessStartInfo.ArgumentList` (natively where supported, and polyfilled in older TFMs), so that the operating system passes argv verbatim and only the shell parses the command once. Upgrade to: • 2.8.5 (2.8.x line) • 2.9.4 (2.9.x line) • 2.10.5 (2.10.x line) • 3.0.0-beta.1 (3.x pre-release line) Workarounds No complete workaround is available. Until upgraded: • Reject or strip `"` from any target path or argument passed to the PowerShell/Cmd wrappers. On 2.2.0 – 2.9.2 and 3.0.0-alpha.1 – alpha.4, also reject shell metacharacters (`;`, `|`, `&`, `$`, backtick, parentheses). • Alternatively, bypass the wrappers for untrusted input and invoke the target process directly so that no second shell parse of the data occurs.