GitHub Advisoryadvisory · PyPI
GHSA-x2c2-q32w-4w6m Vyper's raw_call `value=` kwargs not disabled for static and delegate calls
MEDIUM
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2024-24567
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Packages
- vyper
- Severity
- Moderate
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
- Weaknesses
- CWE-754
- Reviewed
- 2024-01-30
Affected packages
• PyPI vyper: < 0.4.0 → fixed in 0.4.0
Description
Summary
Vyper compiler allows passing a value in builtin `raw_call` even if the call is a `delegatecall` or a `staticcall`. But in the context of `delegatecall` and `staticcall` the handling of value is not possible due to the semantics of the respective opcodes, and vyper will silently ignore the `value=` argument.
A contract search was performed and no vulnerable contracts were found in production.
Details
The IR for `raw_call` is built in the `RawCall` class:
https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/blob/9136169468f317a53b4e7448389aa315f90b95ba/vyper/builtins/functions.py#L1100
However, the compiler doesn't validate that if either `delegatecall` or `staticall` are provided as kwargs, that `value` wasn't set. For example, the following compiles without errors:
```python
raw_call(self, call_data2, max_outsize=255, is_delegate_call=True, value=msg.value/2)
```
Impact
If the semantics of the EVM are unknown to the developer, he could suspect that by specifying the `value` kwarg, exactly the given amount will be sent along to the target. However in fact, no `value` will be sent.
Here is an example of an potentially problematic implementation of multicall utilizing the `raw_call` built-in:
```python
value_accumulator: uint256 = empty(uint256)
results: DynArray[Result, max_value(uint8)] = []
return_data: Bytes[max_value(uint8)] = b""
success: bool = empty(bool)
for batch in data:
msg_value: uint256 = batch.value
value_accumulator = unsafe_add(value_accumulator, msg_value)
if (batch.allow_failure == False):
return_data = raw_call(self, batch.call_data, max_outsize=255, value=msg_value, is_delegate_call=True)
success = True
results.append(Result({success: success, return_data: return_data}))
else:
success, return_data = \
raw_call(self, batch.call_data, max_outsize=255, value=msg_value, is_delegate_call=True, revert_on_failure=False)
results.append(Result({success: success, return_data: return_data}))
assert msg.value == value_accumulator, "Multicall: value mismatch"
return results
```
Patches
Fixed in https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/pull/3755
Workarounds
_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_
References
_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2024-24567 Vyper is a pythonic Smart Contract Language for the ethereum virtual machine. vulnerability
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-754 Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions weakness
References
- https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/security/advisories/GHSA-x2c2-q32w-4w6m web
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-24567 advisory
- https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/pull/3755 web
- https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/commit/a2df08888c318713742c57f71465f32a1c27ed72 web
- https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/vyper/PYSEC-2024-151.yaml web
- https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper package
- https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/blob/9136169468f317a53b4e7448389aa315f90b95ba/vyper/builtins/functions.py#L1100 web