GHSA-x84v-g949-293w Home Assistant: Konnected alarm-panel switch state and zone topology disclosed to unauthenticated actors on the LAN

• PyPI homeassistant: < 2026.6.0 → fixed in 2026.6.0

Summary The Konnected integration registers an HTTP endpoint, `KonnectedView` (`homeassistant/components/konnected/__init__.py`), that is marked as not requiring authentication (`requires_auth = False`). A comment next to that line says auth is instead handled "via the access token from configuration." That promise is only half true: • Write requests (POST and PUT) are handled by `update_sensor()`, which *does* check the request's `Authorization: Bearer ` header against the integration's stored access tokens (using `hmac.compare_digest`). • Read requests (GET) are handled by a separate `get()` method that has no authentication check at all. By sending GET requests to `/api/konnected/device/{device_id}?zone=N`, any unauthenticated client on the LAN can: 1. Enumerate configured Konnected device IDs — the endpoint returns a clean 404-vs-200 difference that acts as an oracle for which devices exist. 2. Read switch output states — the on/off state of every switch output (siren, strobe, and relay outputs of the alarm panel). 3. Read the panel's zone topology — how the alarm panel's zones are configured. 4. Trigger panel connections — each unauthenticated GET forces one outbound `panel.async_connect()` call to the Konnected hardware on the LAN. The same URL that correctly rejects unauthenticated POST and PUT requests silently serves unauthenticated GET requests, leaking alarm-panel state and device topology to anyone who can reach Home Assistant's HTTP port (8123 on the LAN by default). Details This is the threat-model boundary "unauth to auth" the upstream security policy treats as fileable. The same boundary produced CVE-2026-34205 (`Unauthenticated app endpoints exposed to local network via host network mode`, CVSS 9.7 CRITICAL, March 2026) and CVE-2023-50715 (`User accounts disclosed to unauthenticated actors on the LAN`, CVSS 4.2 MODERATE, December 2023). The Konnected gap is structurally identical: a HomeAssistantView with `requires_auth = False` that returns information about configured devices to anyone who can reach the HTTP port. Confirmed end-to-end against `ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.5.2`. The Proof of Concept section below has seven captures. Step 1 cites the three load-bearing source ranges (view registration, the auth check that only POST/PUT use, the GET handler that omits it). Step 2 is the control: POST and PUT on the same URL return `401 unauthorized` without a Bearer token, proving the integration does have an auth check, just only on the write methods. Step 3 is the bug: GET on the same URL with no Authorization header returns `200 {"zone":"5","state":1}` for the siren-output zone, equivalent payload for the strobe and relay-output zones. Step 4 exercises the enumeration oracle: unknown `device_id` returns a 404 with a distinct message from a known `device_id` with an unknown zone, which a brute-forcer uses to map the device-ID and zone space. Step 5 captures the connection-amplification side effect by firing 10 unauthenticated GETs and observing 10 `panel.async_connect()` invocations on the panel side. Step 6 shows that a deliberately wrong `Authorization` header produces the same response as no header at all, confirming the auth header is not consulted on GET. Step 7 captures the HA startup log line that registers `KonnectedView`. Threat model Home Assistant's HTTP server binds to the LAN at port 8123 by default. A Konnected alarm panel is a wired smart-home hardware product whose primary use case is *alarm and security*: zones 1-6 typically read door/window/glass-break sensors, switches 5-8 drive siren, strobe, and relay outputs that control the alarm itself or external systems such as garage-door openers, entry chimes, or armed-disable interlocks. The state an attacker reads through this bug is precisely the live status of those outputs and inputs. The attacker model upstream policy explicitly treats as in-scope is the LAN-adjacent unauthenticated client: a guest who joined the wifi, a neighbor on shared coffee-shop wifi, a malicious device that reached the LAN via a separately compromised IoT product, an attacker who landed via a flat office network, or an attacker who pivoted from a VPN endpoint. None of these positions grant an access token. All of them grant the network reachability the bug requires. The same endpoint is the receiver for legitimate push updates from the Konnected hardware, which is why `requires_auth = False` exists in the first place. The intent was to enforce a shared access token on the body. That intent is present in `update_sensor()` and absent in `get()`. Impact • Alarm-system reconnaissance enabling physical intrusion. A `200 {"zone":"5","state":1}` response on the siren zone tells an attacker the siren is firing right now, which means a burglary is in progress and the operator may be away or distracted. A `state:0` on the same zone says the panel is quiet. The same applies to strobes, armed-disable relays, and any switch the operator wired through Konnected. This is the intelligence a physical attacker explicitly seeks before entering a property. • Topology disclosure. Probing zones 1 through 12 across a known device_id maps the alarm panel: which zones are sensors, which are switches, which switches are configured for which output. Combined with manufacturer documentation, the topology tells an attacker which physical control points to bypass. • Device ID brute force. The 404 "Device not configured" oracle on unknown IDs versus 404 "Switch on zone or pin not configured" on known IDs with unknown zones, versus 200 with state on full hits, is a clean four-state oracle. Konnected hardware derives `device_id` from its NIC MAC address; production hardware ships with a small set of manufacturer OUI prefixes. The brute force space is on the order of 2^24, trivially scannable from any LAN host with no rate limit. • Outbound connection amplification. Line 397 of `__init__.py` fires `hass.async_create_task(panel.async_connect())` on every successful GET. An unauth attacker drives N outbound connect attempts toward the (typically LAN-private) Konnected hardware with N unauth GETs, no rate limit, no auth log. A 10-rps sustained scan produces a constant connect storm against the panel hardware that, depending on Konnected firmware, may interfere with legitimate push delivery or cause spurious connect/disconnect cycles visible in the operator's notification stream. • No auth trail. The GET handler logs nothing at INFO level. An attacker can probe this endpoint at arbitrary depth and leave no record in `home-assistant.log` unless DEBUG logging is enabled for the integration. Affected code `homeassistant/components/konnected/__init__.py:296-301`, the view registration. The comment on line 301 is load-bearing for the bug: it says auth happens via the configured access token, but that promise is only kept on the POST/PUT path. ```python class KonnectedView(HomeAssistantView): """View creates an endpoint to receive push updates from the device.""" url = UPDATE_ENDPOINT # /api/konnected/device/{device_id:[a-zA-Z0-9]+} name = "api:konnected" requires_auth = False # Uses access token from configuration ``` `homeassistant/components/konnected/__init__.py:313-335`, the auth check that lives inside `update_sensor()`. POST and PUT call this; GET does not. ```python async def update_sensor(self, request: Request, device_id) -> Response: """Process a put or post.""" hass = request.app[KEY_HASS] data = hass.data[DOMAIN] auth = request.headers.get(AUTHORIZATION) tokens = [] if hass.data[DOMAIN].get(CONF_ACCESS_TOKEN): tokens.extend([hass.data[DOMAIN][CONF_ACCESS_TOKEN]]) tokens.extend( [ entry.data[CONF_ACCESS_TOKEN] for entry in hass.config_entries.async_entries(DOMAIN) if entry.data.get(CONF_ACCESS_TOKEN) ] ) if …