GHSA-xff3-5c9p-2mr4 New API: Stripe Webhook Signature Bypass via Empty Secret Enables Unlimited Quota Fraud

• Go github.com/QuantumNous/new-api: < 0.12.10 → fixed in 0.12.10

Summary A critical vulnerability exists in the Stripe webhook handler that allows an unauthenticated attacker to forge webhook events and credit arbitrary quota to their account without making any payment. The vulnerability stems from three compounding flaws: 1. The Stripe webhook endpoint does not reject requests when `StripeWebhookSecret` is empty (the default). 2. When the HMAC secret is empty, any attacker can compute valid webhook signatures, effectively bypassing signature verification entirely. 3. The `Recharge` function does not validate that the order's `PaymentMethod` matches the callback source, enabling cross-gateway exploitation — an order created via any payment method (e.g., Epay) can be fulfilled through a forged Stripe webhook. Affected Components • `controller/topup_stripe.go` — `StripeWebhook()`, `sessionCompleted()` • `model/topup.go` — `Recharge()`, `RechargeCreem()`, `RechargeWaffo()` • `controller/topup.go` — `EpayNotify()` • `controller/topup_creem.go` — `CreemAdaptor.RequestPay()` (missing `PaymentMethod` field) • `router/api-router.go` — webhook route registered without any guard CWE Classification • CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity • CWE-1188: Initialization with an Insecure Default (empty webhook secret) • CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization (cross-gateway order fulfillment) Vulnerability Details Flaw 1: Empty Webhook Secret Bypasses Signature Verification The `StripeWebhookSecret` setting defaults to an empty string `""`. The Stripe Go SDK (`webhook.ConstructEventWithOptions`) does not reject empty secrets — it computes `HMAC-SHA256` with an empty key, producing a deterministic and publicly computable signature. Vulnerable code (`controller/topup_stripe.go`): ```go func StripeWebhook(c *gin.Context) { // No check for empty StripeWebhookSecret payload, _ := io.ReadAll(c.Request.Body) signature := c.GetHeader("Stripe-Signature") endpointSecret := setting.StripeWebhookSecret // defaults to "" event, err := webhook.ConstructEventWithOptions(payload, signature, endpointSecret, ...) // When secret is "", attacker can compute valid HMAC with the same empty key } ``` The webhook route is unconditionally registered with no authentication middleware and no rate limiting: ```go apiRouter.POST("/stripe/webhook", controller.StripeWebhook) ``` Flaw 2: Missing `payment_status` Verification The `sessionCompleted` handler only checks `status == "complete"` but does not verify `payment_status == "paid"`. Stripe's `checkout.session.completed` event can fire with `payment_status = "unpaid"` for delayed payment methods (bank transfer, SEPA, Boleto, etc.) or `payment_status = "no_payment_required"` for 100% discount coupons. Additionally, `checkout.session.async_payment_succeeded` and `checkout.session.async_payment_failed` events are not handled, so delayed payments that ultimately fail are never rolled back. Flaw 3: Cross-Gateway Order Fulfillment (No PaymentMethod Validation) The `model.Recharge()` function (called by the Stripe webhook) looks up orders solely by `trade_no` and does not validate that the order's `PaymentMethod` is `"stripe"`: ```go func Recharge(referenceId string, customerId string) (err error) { // Finds ANY pending order by trade_no, regardless of PaymentMethod tx.Where("trade_no = ?", referenceId).First(topUp) if topUp.Status != "pending" { return } // Credits quota without checking topUp.PaymentMethod quota = topUp.Money * QuotaPerUnit tx.Model(&User{}).Update("quota", gorm.Expr("quota + ?", quota)) } ``` This allows an attacker to create orders through any configured payment gateway (Epay, Creem, Waffo) and then complete them via a forged Stripe webhook — even if Stripe itself was never configured. Attack Scenario Prerequisites: Any payment method is configured (e.g., Epay) + `StripeWebhookSecret` is empty (default). 1. Attacker registers a user account. 2. Attacker calls `POST /api/user/pay` to create an Epay top-up order (e.g., `amount=10000`). The order is stored with `status=pending`. 3. Attacker queries `GET /api/user/topup/self` to retrieve the `trade_no` of the pending order. 4. Attacker computes `HMAC-SHA256` with an empty key over a crafted `checkout.session.completed` payload containing the stolen `trade_no` as `client_reference_id`. 5. Attacker sends `POST /api/stripe/webhook` with the forged payload and signature header. 6. The server verifies the signature (passes because the secret is empty), calls `Recharge()`, which finds the Epay order by `trade_no`, marks it as `success`, and credits the full quota. 7. Attacker repeats steps 2–6 indefinitely for unlimited credits. Proof of concept (pseudocode): ```python import hmac, hashlib, time, json, requests timestamp = int(time.time()) payload = json.dumps({ "type": "checkout.session.completed", "data": { "object": { "client_reference_id": "", "status": "complete", "payment_status": "paid", "customer": "cus_fake", "amount_total": "0", "currency": "usd" } } }) Empty secret = publicly computable signature sig = hmac.new(b"", f"{timestamp}.{payload}".encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest() header = f"t={timestamp},v1={sig}" requests.post("https://target/api/stripe/webhook", data=payload, headers={"Stripe-Signature": header, "Content-Type": "application/json"}) ``` Remediation Fix 1: Reject webhooks when secret is empty ```go func StripeWebhook(c *gin.Context) { if setting.StripeWebhookSecret == "" { c.AbortWithStatus(http.StatusForbidden) return } // ... existing logic } ``` Fix 2: Verify `payment_status` and handle async payment events ```go func sessionCompleted(event stripe.Event) { // ... existing status check ... paymentStatus := event.GetObjectValue("payment_status") if paymentStatus != "paid" { return // Wait for async_payment_succeeded event } fulfillOrder(event, referenceId, customerId) } ``` Add handlers for `checkout.session.async_payment_succeeded` and `checkout.session.async_payment_failed`. Fix 3: Validate PaymentMethod in all recharge functions ```go // In model.Recharge (Stripe): if topUp.PaymentMethod != "stripe" { return ErrPaymentMethodMismatch } // In model.RechargeCreem: if topUp.PaymentMethod != "creem" { return ErrPaymentMethodMismatch } // In model.RechargeWaffo: if topUp.PaymentMethod != "waffo" { return ErrPaymentMethodMismatch } // In controller.EpayNotify: if topUp.PaymentMethod == "stripe" || topUp.PaymentMethod == "creem" || topUp.PaymentMethod == "waffo" { return // reject cross-gateway fulfillment } ``` Additional fix: Set PaymentMethod on Creem order creation The Creem order creation was missing the `PaymentMethod` field entirely: ```go topUp := &model.TopUp{ // ... PaymentMethod: "creem", // was missing } ``` Patched Versions • v0.12.10 — includes all three fixes described above. All users are strongly encouraged to upgrade immediately. Workaround (for users unable to upgrade immediately) If users cannot upgrade to v0.12.10 right away, apply all of the following mitigations: 1. Set `StripeWebhookSecret` to any non-empty value. Go to the admin panel → Payment → Stripe, and set the Webhook Signing Secret to any random string (e.g., `whsec_placeholder_do_not_leave_empty`). It does not need to be a real Stripe secret — any non-empty value will prevent the empty-key HMAC forgery. This is the single most important step — it closes the primary attack vector. If Stripe payments are used in production, replace with the real secret from the project's Stripe Dashboard → Webhooks to ensure legitimate webhooks continue to work. 2. If Stripe is not in use, block the webhook endpoint. If users have not configur…