GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Go

GHSA-xgx4-4h9w-53pv AdGuard Home: DoQ-to-UDP State Reduction and Source-Port Oracle

MEDIUM Published 2026-06-04 Modified 2026-07-20 Official page ↗
Aliases
CVE-2026-47703
Ecosystem
Go
Packages
github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome, github.com/AdguardTeam/dnsproxy
Severity
Moderate
CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Weaknesses
CWE-330, CWE-362, CWE-662
Reviewed
2026-06-04

Affected packages

• Go github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome: < 0.107.75 → fixed in 0.107.75 • Go github.com/AdguardTeam/dnsproxy: < 0.81.3 → fixed in 0.81.3

Description

Summary This report covers the client-triggered DoQ forwarding path in: • `dnsproxy` `v0.81.2` (`adguard/dnsproxy:v0.81.2`) • `AdGuard Home` `v0.107.74` (`adguard/adguardhome:latest`, image version label `v0.107.74`) The issue was reproduced on `2026-04-25` with the products configured through their documented DoQ listener and plain UDP upstream surfaces. The scope is the internal backend UDP hop created when a DoQ query is forwarded to a `udp://` upstream. On that path, the backend DNS `ID` is not preserved as an independent source of entropy. For both products, the backend observer saw `dns_id=0` for every sampled client-triggered query on the tested path. Repeated reruns then showed the same `txid=0` behavior and the same positive source-port oracle on every sampled run. A separate quoted-port ICMP oracle distinguished the correct backend UDP source port from a wrong one with a stable, client-visible behavior change. Attached evidence: • `dnsproxy` oracle path on `v0.81.2`: attachments/artifacts/g03/20260425T141500Z-g03-v0812/summary.txt • `dnsproxy` `v0.81.2` repeatability: attachments/artifacts/g03/repeatability-v0812.md • `dnsproxy` steering follow-up on `v0.81.2`: attachments/artifacts/g04/20260425T141900Z-g04-v0812/summary.txt • `AdGuard Home` oracle path: attachments/artifacts/g05/20260425T113000Z-g05/summary.txt Root Cause Analysis The observable behavior is consistent across both products: 1. A DoQ client query is accepted on the frontend listener. 2. The query is forwarded over a backend UDP leg. 3. On that backend leg, the forwarded DNS `ID` collapses to `0` on the client-triggered path instead of remaining a fresh per-query variable. 4. The backend UDP source port is still allocated per query. 5. When an ICMP error quotes the actual backend source port, the forwarding path flips behavior in a way that does not occur for a wrong quoted port. That combination removes `txid` from the backend tuple on the tested path and leaves the UDP source port as the main remaining variable. In practical terms, the backend hop stops behaving like a fresh `(txid, source-port)` pair per forwarded query and instead becomes a one-variable state exposure. For `dnsproxy`, the correct quoted port does more than produce a failure signal: it can push resolution away from the primary UDP upstream and into the fallback upstream. For `AdGuard Home`, the same condition produces a fast `SERVFAIL`. Reproduce Prerequisites: • Docker and Docker Compose • OpenSSL • build the lab helper image used by the attached harness and observer The attached reproducer bundle contains only the files needed for this report: • scripts: `attachments/scripts/` • helper image build files: `attachments/docker/unbound-doq-attacker/` • compose files: `attachments/docker-compose.g03.yml`, `attachments/docker-compose.g04.yml`, `attachments/docker-compose.g05.yml` • shipped evidence: `attachments/artifacts/...` Build the helper image first: 1. `cd attachments` 2. `docker build -t unbound-doq-attacker:latest -f docker/unbound-doq-attacker/Dockerfile docker/unbound-doq-attacker` To rerun `dnsproxy`: 1. `cd attachments` 2. `bash scripts/repro-g03-dnsproxy-oracle.sh` 3. Inspect `artifacts/g03//summary.txt` 4. Inspect `artifacts/g03//entropy-backend.jsonl`, `txid_correct-backend.jsonl`, and `port_correct-backend.jsonl` To rerun the `dnsproxy` fallback-steering case: 1. `cd attachments` 2. `bash scripts/repro-g04-dnsproxy-steering.sh` 3. Inspect `artifacts/g04//summary.txt` 4. Inspect `steering_correct-main.jsonl` and `steering_correct-fallback.jsonl` To rerun `AdGuard Home`: 1. `cd attachments` 2. `bash scripts/repro-g05-adguardhome-oracle.sh` 3. Inspect `artifacts/g05//summary.txt` 4. Inspect `entropy-backend.jsonl`, `txid_correct-backend.jsonl`, and `port_correct-backend.jsonl` The attached evidence includes fresh `dnsproxy v0.81.2` reruns, one official- profile `AdGuard Home` run, and the minimal reproducer bundle used by both. Impact For both products, the tested DoQ-to-UDP path is no longer a full `(txid, source-port)` search surface: • `dnsproxy`: four of four sampled runs showed `txid=0` on the backend hop and a positive source-port oracle on `v0.81.2`. The remaining unknown is `port_only`. Median wrong/correct port latency was `327.99 ms / 40.93 ms`. • `AdGuard Home`: four of four sampled runs showed `txid=0` on the backend hop and a positive source-port oracle. The aggregate again classifies the remaining unknown as `port_only`. Median wrong/correct port latency was `319.14 ms / 37.02 ms`. Product-specific effects: • `dnsproxy`: a correct port guess produced an empty client-visible answer on the base oracle path, and in the fallback profile it steered all eight tested queries away from the main upstream and into the fallback upstream. • `AdGuard Home`: a correct port guess produced fast `SERVFAIL` and an extra backend query. This is the security-relevant point. On the tested official profiles, the backend hop no longer forces an off-path attacker to deal with two fresh random fields per forwarded DNS race. The DNS ID is already known: it is deterministically `0` on the client-triggered DoQ-to-UDP path. The only remaining backend tuple variable is the UDP source port, and the attached evidence shows a repeatable oracle for that remaining variable. That places the path in the same threat-model class as oracle-assisted DNS forgery work such as SAD DNS and TUdoor: the attack first uses an oracle to learn or validate the tuple state that protects an off-path response race, and only then attempts the forged response. This report stops short of a forgery demo, but the evidence already shows the crucial precondition on the tested backend hop: the tuple is not high-entropy anymore. It has been reduced from `(txid, source-port)` to `source-port` only. --- Attachments attachments.zip

Related

Alias · CVE (1)

  • CVE-2026-47703 AdGuard Home is a network-wide software for blocking ads and tracking. vulnerability

Weakness · CWE (3)

  • CWE-330 Use of Insufficiently Random Values weakness
  • CWE-362 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization weakness
  • CWE-662 Improper Synchronization weakness

References