GitHub Advisoryadvisory · crates.io

GHSA-xhj4-vrgc-hr34 actix-http has HTTP/1.1 CL.TE Request Smuggling

MEDIUM Published 2026-04-22 Modified 2026-04-22 Official page ↗
Ecosystem
crates.io
Packages
actix-http
Severity
Moderate
CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Weaknesses
CWE-444
Reviewed
2026-04-22

Affected packages

• crates.io actix-http: < 3.12.1 → fixed in 3.12.1

Description

A vulnerability in `actix-http`'s HTTP/1.1 request parser allows an unauthenticated remote client to smuggle requests in deployments where a front-end HTTP intermediary and the Actix backend disagree about whether `Content-Length` or `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` defines the request body length. Severity Medium. This is an HTTP request smuggling vulnerability that can be triggered over the network without application-level credentials. Exploitation requires a specific proxy topology: an upstream proxy, WAF, load balancer, or similar intermediary must use `Content-Length` framing while forwarding the conflicting `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` request to an Actix backend over a reused HTTP/1.1 connection. Affected Versions • `actix-http`: versions up to and including 3.12.0 Description HTTP/1.1 requests that contain both `Content-Length` and `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` are ambiguous and must be rejected by recipients to avoid request smuggling. Affected versions of `actix-http` accepted a request with a syntactically valid `Content-Length` header and `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` on the same HTTP/1.1 message. The parser then selected chunked decoding instead of rejecting the conflicting framing signals. In a CL.TE proxy topology, an intermediary may treat bytes after the declared `Content-Length` body as part of the first request, while the Actix backend stops at the terminating chunk marker and parses the remaining bytes on the backend connection as a second HTTP request. This creates a backend-side request desynchronization primitive. The issue is limited to HTTP/1.1 request parsing. Impact HTTP request smuggling • Attack Vector: Network, unauthenticated. • Effect: Backend request desynchronization with low integrity impact to requests processed by the vulnerable Actix service. • Scope: Actix services using affected `actix-http` versions behind an HTTP/1.1 intermediary that forwards ambiguous `Content-Length` plus `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` requests and reuses backend connections. No direct confidentiality, availability, or subsequent-system impact is scored for this advisory. Fixed Versions This issue is fixed in actix-http 3.12.1. The fix rejects HTTP/1.1 requests that contain both `Content-Length` and `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` instead of choosing one framing interpretation. Mitigation Users should upgrade to actix-http 3.12.1 or later. Applications that depend on `actix-http` through `actix-web`, `awc`, or another Actix crate should ensure dependency resolution selects `actix-http` 3.12.1 or later. For example: ```bash cargo update -p actix-http ``` If an immediate upgrade is not possible, configure all upstream HTTP intermediaries to reject HTTP/1.1 requests that contain both `Content-Length` and `Transfer-Encoding`, and avoid forwarding ambiguous request framing to Actix backends. Credits Actix thanks mufeedvh who disclosed this issue through coordinated disclosure.

Related

Weakness · CWE (1)

  • CWE-444 Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests weakness

References