GHSA-xvhc-gm7j-mhmc Shopware: Stored XSS via SVG file upload — no SVG sanitization

• Packagist shopware/core: >= 6.7.0.0, < 6.7.10.1 → fixed in 6.7.10.1 • Packagist shopware/core: < 6.6.10.18 → fixed in 6.6.10.18 • Packagist shopware/platform: >= 6.7.0.0, < 6.7.10.1 → fixed in 6.7.10.1 • Packagist shopware/platform: < 6.6.10.18 → fixed in 6.6.10.18

SVG files are in the `allowed_extensions` whitelist and can be uploaded by any admin user via the media manager. There is zero SVG content sanitization anywhere in the upload pipeline. A malicious SVG with JavaScript (`onload`, ``, ``) executes in the context of the Shopware domain when accessed. The Problem In `src/Core/Framework/Resources/config/packages/shopware.yaml`, line 194: ```yaml allowed_extensions: ["jpg", "jpeg", "png", "webp", "avif", "gif", "svg", ...] ``` SVG is whitelisted. The upload path (`MediaUploadController` → `FileSaver` → `TypeDetector`) recognizes SVG as `ImageType` with `VECTOR_GRAPHIC` flag, but no code strips JavaScript, event handlers, or external entity references from the SVG XML. A search of the entire codebase for SVG sanitization returns — no `DOMPurify`, no `svg-sanitize`, no `strip_tags` on SVG content, nothing. Impact Stored XSS affecting all users who view the uploaded SVG. In an e-commerce context, this can lead to admin account takeover, customer data theft, or malicious plugin installation. Suggested Fix Either: 1. Remove SVG from `allowed_extensions` if SVG upload is not a core requirement 2. Sanitize SVG content on upload using a library like `enshrined/svg-sanitize` (strips scripts, event handlers, external references) 3. Serve SVGs with `Content-Disposition: attachment` to prevent inline rendering 4. Serve SVGs from a separate domain (like Nextcloud's `usercontent.apps.nextcloud.com`) Option 2 is the most practical — `enshrined/svg-sanitize` is already used by WordPress and other PHP projects. Regards & BG, Keyvan Hardani