GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Go
GHSA-xwh2-742g-w3wp Miniflux Media Proxy SSRF via /proxy endpoint allows access to internal network resources
MEDIUM
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-21885
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Packages
- miniflux.app/v2
- Severity
- Moderate
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-918
- Reviewed
- 2026-01-07
Affected packages
• Go miniflux.app/v2: < 2.2.16 → fixed in 2.2.16
Description
Summary
Miniflux's media proxy endpoint (`GET /proxy/{encodedDigest}/{encodedURL}`) can be abused to perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). An authenticated user can cause Miniflux to generate a signed proxy URL for attacker-chosen media URLs embedded in feed entry content, including internal addresses (e.g., localhost, private RFC1918 ranges, or link-local metadata endpoints). Requesting the resulting `/proxy/...` URL makes Miniflux fetch and return the internal response.
Details
• Vulnerable route: `GET /proxy/{encodedDigest}/{encodedURL}` (accessible without authentication, but requires a server-generated HMAC-signed URL)
• Handler: `internal/ui/proxy.go` (`(*handler).mediaProxy`)
• Trigger: entry content is rewritten to proxy media URLs (e.g., `mediaproxy.RewriteDocumentWithAbsoluteProxyURL(...)`), producing signed `/proxy/...` URLs.
• Root cause: the proxy validates the URL scheme and HMAC signature, but does not restrict target hosts/IPs. As a result, requests to loopback/private/link-local addresses are allowed and fetched by the server.
PoC
1) Run Miniflux 2.2.15 with default configuration (media proxy enabled by default: `MEDIA_PROXY_MODE=http-only`).
2) Log in with any normal user account.
3) Subscribe to a feed you control that contains an entry with an image URL pointing to an internal address reachable from the Miniflux server, e.g.:
• `/secret">`
(Note: `` must be reachable *from the Miniflux process/network*; in containerized setups, `127.0.0.1` may not refer to the host.)
4) Open the entry and locate the rewritten media proxy URL (`/proxy//`) in the rendered HTML/page source.
5) Request the `/proxy/...` URL.
Expected (vulnerable): Miniflux fetches the internal URL and returns the internal response (SSRF).
Impact
Type: SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) via media proxy
Who is impacted: Miniflux instances with media proxy enabled (default configuration typically enables it for HTTP/mixed content handling).
Impact: attackers with a valid Miniflux account can fetch internal resources reachable from the Miniflux server (e.g., localhost services, private network services, and link-local endpoints such as 169.254.169.254), potentially exposing sensitive data.
Suggested CVSS (v3.1)
`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N` (Base 6.5)
If there any questions or issues reproducing this, please contact: [email protected]
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-21885 Miniflux 2 is an open source feed reader. vulnerability
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery weakness