MITRE ATT&CKsub-technique
T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy
- Domain
- enterprise
- Tactics
- Command And Control
- Platforms
- ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
- Version
- 2.4
- Created
- 2020-03-14
Description
Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.
For example, adversaries may construct or use onion routing networks – such as the publicly available Tor network – to transport encrypted C2 traffic through a compromised population, allowing communication with any device within the network. Adversaries may also use operational relay box (ORB) networks composed of virtual private servers (VPS), Internet of Things (IoT) devices, smart devices, and end-of-life routers to obfuscate their operations.
In the case of network infrastructure, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain (i.e., Network Devices). By leveraging Patch System Image on routers, adversaries can add custom code to the affected network devices that will implement onion routing between those nodes. This method is dependent upon the Network Boundary Bridging method allowing the adversaries to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perimeter and into the organization’s Wide-Area Network (WAN). Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport.
Similarly, adversaries may abuse peer-to-peer (P2P) and blockchain-oriented infrastructure to implement routing between a decentralized network of peers.
Related
Subtechnique of · MITRE ATT&CK (1)
- T1090 Proxy technique
Tactic · MITRE ATT&CK (1)
- TA0011 Command and Control tactic
Referenced by MITRE ATT&CK · mitigates (1)
- M1037 Filter Network Traffic mitigation
Referenced by MITRE ATT&CK · uses (44)
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- S9043 Mini Shai-Hulud software (malware)
- C0063 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks campaign
- S9001 SystemBC software (malware)
- C0059 Salesforce Data Exfiltration campaign
- G1051 Medusa Group group
- C0056 RedPenguin campaign
- C0055 Quad7 Activity campaign
- C0052 SPACEHOP Activity campaign
- C0053 FLORAHOX Activity campaign
- G1045 Salt Typhoon group
- S1184 BOLDMOVE software (malware)
- S1144 FRP software (tool)
- S1106 NGLite software (malware)
- S1107 NKAbuse software (malware)
- S1100 Ninja software (malware)
- S1087 AsyncRAT software (tool)
- G1017 Volt Typhoon group
- C0014 Operation Wocao campaign
- C0004 CostaRicto campaign
- G1003 Ember Bear group
- S0687 Cyclops Blink software (malware)
- S0641 Kobalos software (malware)
- S0623 Siloscape software (malware)
- G0128 ZIRCONIUM group
- S0604 Industroyer software (malware)
- S0491 StrongPity software (malware)
- G0100 Inception group
- S0438 Attor software (malware)
- S0386 Ursnif software (malware)
Referenced by Compliance · mitigates (12)
- CIS-13.10 Perform Application Layer Filtering CIS Safeguard v8.1
- CIS-13.4 Perform Traffic Filtering Between Network Segments CIS Safeguard v8.1
- CIS-4.4 Implement and Manage a Firewall on Servers CIS Safeguard v8.1
- CIS-4.5 Implement and Manage a Firewall on End-User Devices CIS Safeguard v8.1
- NIST-AC-3 Access Enforcement NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CA-7 Continuous Monitoring NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CM-6 Configuration Settings NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CM-7 Least Functionality NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SC-7 Boundary Protection NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SI-10 Information Input Validation NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SI-15 Information Output Filtering NIST 800-53 control