MITRE ATT&CKsub-technique
T1110.001 Password Guessing
- Domain
- enterprise
- Tactics
- Credential Access
- Platforms
- Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, SaaS, Windows
- Version
- 1.7
- Created
- 2020-02-11
Description
Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or may not take into account the target's policies on password complexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a number of failed attempts.
Guessing passwords can be a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies.
Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when guessing passwords. Commonly targeted services include the following:
• SSH (22/TCP)
• Telnet (23/TCP)
• FTP (21/TCP)
• NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)
• LDAP (389/TCP)
• Kerberos (88/TCP)
• RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)
• HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)
• MSSQL (1433/TCP)
• Oracle (1521/TCP)
• MySQL (3306/TCP)
• VNC (5900/TCP)
• SNMP (161/UDP and 162/TCP/UDP)
In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.. Further, adversaries may abuse network device interfaces (such as `wlanAPI`) to brute force accessible wifi-router(s) via wireless authentication protocols.
In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625.
Related
Subtechnique of · MITRE ATT&CK (1)
- T1110 Brute Force technique
Tactic · MITRE ATT&CK (1)
- TA0006 Credential Access tactic
Referenced by MITRE ATT&CK · mitigates (4)
Referenced by MITRE ATT&CK · uses (13)
- G1055 VOID MANTICORE group
- G1045 Salt Typhoon group
- S0698 HermeticWizard software (malware)
- S0598 P.A.S. Webshell software (malware)
- S0532 Lucifer software (malware)
- S0488 CrackMapExec software (tool)
- S0453 Pony software (malware)
- S0374 SpeakUp software (malware)
- S0367 Emotet software (malware)
- S0341 Xbash software (malware)
- G0007 APT28 group
- G0016 APT29 group
- S0020 China Chopper software (malware)
Referenced by CAPEC · att&ck technique (1)
- CAPEC-49 Password Brute Forcing attack pattern
Referenced by Compliance · mitigates (19)
- CIS-13.5 Manage Access Control for Remote Access CIS Safeguard v8.1
- CIS-4.10 Enforce Automatic Device Lockout on Portable End-User Devices CIS Safeguard v8.1
- CIS-5.2 Use Unique Passwords CIS Safeguard v8.1
- CIS-6.3 Require MFA for Externally-Exposed Applications CIS Safeguard v8.1
- CIS-6.5 Require MFA for Administrative Access CIS Safeguard v8.1
- NIST-AC-2 Account Management NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-AC-20 Use of External Systems NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-AC-3 Access Enforcement NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-AC-5 Separation of Duties NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-AC-6 Least Privilege NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-AC-7 Unsuccessful Logon Attempts NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CA-7 Continuous Monitoring NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CM-2 Baseline Configuration NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CM-6 Configuration Settings NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-IA-11 Re-authentication NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-IA-2 Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-IA-4 Identifier Management NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-IA-5 Authenticator Management NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SI-4 System Monitoring NIST 800-53 control
References
- https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/emotet-now-spreads-via-wi-fi Trend Micro Emotet 2020
- https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf Cylance Cleaver
- https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A US-CERT TA18-068A 2018