MITRE ATT&CKtechnique
T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
- Domain
- enterprise
- Tactics
- Initial Access
- Platforms
- Linux, Windows, macOS, SaaS
- Version
- 1.7
- Created
- 2018-04-18
Description
Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.
Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:
• Manipulation of development tools
• Manipulation of a development environment
• Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)
• Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies
• Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms
• Compromised/infected system images (removable media infected at the factory)
• Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions
• Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors
• Shipment interdiction
While supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, adversaries looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels. Adversaries may limit targeting to a desired victim set or distribute malicious software to a broad set of consumers but only follow up with specific victims. Popular open-source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.
In some cases, adversaries may conduct “second-order” supply chain compromises by leveraging the access gained from an initial supply chain compromise to further compromise a software component. This may allow the threat actor to spread to even more victims.
Related
Tactic · MITRE ATT&CK (1)
- TA0001 Initial Access tactic
Referenced by MITRE ATT&CK · mitigates (6)
Referenced by MITRE ATT&CK · subtechnique of (3)
Referenced by MITRE ATT&CK · uses (5)
Referenced by CAPEC · att&ck technique (3)
Referenced by Compliance · mitigates (28)
- CIS-16.11 Leverage Vetted Modules or Services for Application Security Components CIS Safeguard v8.1
- CIS-16.12 Implement Code-Level Security Checks CIS Safeguard v8.1
- CIS-16.3 Perform Root Cause Analysis on Security Vulnerabilities CIS Safeguard v8.1
- CIS-16.5 Use Up-to-Date and Trusted Third-Party Software Components CIS Safeguard v8.1
- CIS-6.8 Define and Maintain Role-Based Access Control CIS Safeguard v8.1
- CIS-7.3 Perform Automated Operating System Patch Management CIS Safeguard v8.1
- NIST-AC-2 Account Management NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-AC-3 Access Enforcement NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-AC-6 Least Privilege NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CA-2 Control Assessments NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CA-7 Continuous Monitoring NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CM-11 User-installed Software NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CM-2 Baseline Configuration NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CM-3 Configuration Change Control NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CM-5 Access Restrictions for Change NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CM-6 Configuration Settings NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CM-7 Least Functionality NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CM-8 System Component Inventory NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-RA-10 Threat Hunting NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-RA-5 Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SA-22 Unsupported System Components NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SI-2 Flaw Remediation NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SI-3 Malicious Code Protection NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SI-4 System Monitoring NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SR-11 Component Authenticity NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SR-4 Provenance NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SR-5 Acquisition Strategies, Tools, and Methods NIST 800-53 control
References
- https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities Avast CCleaner3 2018
- https://krebsonsecurity.com/2023/04/3cx-breach-was-a-double-supply-chain-compromise/ Krebs 3cx overview 2023
- https://web.archive.org/web/20160309235002/https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf Command Five SK 2011
- https://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ssg1S1010146&myns=s028&mynp=OCSTHGUJ&mynp=OCSTLM5A&mynp=OCSTLM6B&mynp=OCHW206&mync=E&cm_sp=s028-_-OCSTHGUJ-OCSTLM5A-OCSTLM6B-OCHW206-_-E IBM Storwize
- https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http:/www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012
- https://www.se.com/us/en/download/document/SESN-2018-236-01/ Schneider Electric USB Malware
- https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets Trendmicro NPM Compromise
- https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/03/07/behavior-monitoring-combined-with-machine-learning-spoils-a-massive-dofoil-coin-mining-campaign/ Microsoft Dofoil 2018