MITRE ATT&CKsub-technique
T1542.003 Bootkit
- Domain
- enterprise
- Tactics
- Stealth, Persistence
- Platforms
- Linux, Windows
- Version
- 2.0
- Created
- 2019-12-19
Description
Adversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems. A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, allowing malicious code to execute before a computer's operating system has loaded. Bootkits reside at a layer below the operating system and may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.
In BIOS systems, a bootkit may modify the Master Boot Record (MBR) and/or Volume Boot Record (VBR). The MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code.
The MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.
In UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) systems, a bootkit may instead create or modify files in the EFI system partition (ESP). The ESP is a partition on data storage used by devices containing UEFI that allows the system to boot the OS and other utilities used by the system. An adversary can use the newly created or patched files in the ESP to run malicious kernel code.
Related
Subtechnique of · MITRE ATT&CK (1)
- T1542 Pre-OS Boot technique
Referenced by MITRE ATT&CK · mitigates (2)
Referenced by MITRE ATT&CK · uses (9)
Referenced by CAPEC · att&ck technique (1)
- CAPEC-552 Install Rootkit attack pattern
Referenced by Compliance · mitigates (18)
- NIST-AC-2 Account Management NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-AC-3 Access Enforcement NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-AC-5 Separation of Duties NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-AC-6 Least Privilege NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CM-2 Baseline Configuration NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CM-3 Configuration Change Control NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CM-5 Access Restrictions for Change NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CM-6 Configuration Settings NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CM-8 System Component Inventory NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-IA-2 Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-IA-7 Cryptographic Module Authentication NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-IA-8 Identification and Authentication (Non-organizational Users) NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-RA-9 Criticality Analysis NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SA-10 Developer Configuration Management NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SA-11 Developer Testing and Evaluation NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SC-34 Non-modifiable Executable Programs NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SI-2 Flaw Remediation NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity NIST 800-53 control
References
- http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-mbr-infections-back-fashion Lau 2011
- https://web.archive.org/web/20211024160454/https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf Mandiant M Trends 2016
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/03/01/blacklotus-uefi-bootkit-myth-confirmed/ welivesecurity
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/04/11/guidance-for-investigating-attacks-using-cve-2022-21894-the-blacklotus-campaign/ Microsoft Security