MITRE ATT&CKsub-technique
T1557.001 Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay
- Domain
- enterprise
- Tactics
- Credential Access, Collection
- Platforms
- Windows
- Version
- 2.0
- Created
- 2020-02-11
Description
By responding to LLMNR/NBT-NS/mDNS network traffic, adversaries may spoof an authoritative source for name resolution to force communication with an adversary controlled system. This activity may be used to collect or relay authentication materials.
Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) and NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) are Microsoft Windows components that serve as alternate methods of host identification. LLMNR is based upon the Domain Name System (DNS) format and allows hosts on the same local link to perform name resolution for other hosts. NBT-NS identifies systems on a local network by their NetBIOS name.
Multicast Domain Name System(mDNS) is a zero-configuration service used to resolve hostnames to IP addresses with “.local” as a top-level domain. MDNS is based upon Domain Name System (DNS) format and allows hosts on the same network segment to perform name resolution for other hosts, using multicast.
Adversaries can spoof an authoritative source for name resolution on a victim network by responding to LLMNR (UDP 5355)/NBT-NS (UDP 137)/mDNS (UDP 5353) traffic as if they know the identity of the requested host, effectively poisoning the service so that the victims will communicate with the adversary controlled system. If the requested host belongs to a resource that requires identification/authentication, the username and NTLMv2 hash will then be sent to the adversary controlled system. The adversary can then collect the hash information sent over the wire through tools that monitor the ports for traffic or through Network Sniffing and crack the hashes offline through Brute Force to obtain the plaintext passwords.
In some cases where an adversary has access to a system that is in the authentication path between systems or when automated scans that use credentials attempt to authenticate to an adversary controlled system, the NTLMv1/v2 hashes can be intercepted and relayed to access and execute code against a target system. The relay step can happen in conjunction with poisoning but may also be independent of it. Additionally, adversaries may encapsulate the NTLMv1/v2 hashes into various other protocols, such as LDAP, MSSQL and HTTP, to expand and use multiple services with the valid NTLM response.
Several tools may be used to poison name services within local networks such as NBNSpoof, Metasploit, and Responder.
Related
Subtechnique of · MITRE ATT&CK (1)
- T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle technique
Referenced by MITRE ATT&CK · mitigates (4)
Referenced by MITRE ATT&CK · uses (7)
Referenced by Compliance · mitigates (22)
- CIS-12.2 Establish and Maintain a Secure Network Architecture CIS Safeguard v8.1
- CIS-12.8 Establish and Maintain Dedicated Computing Resources for All Administrative Work CIS Safeguard v8.1
- CIS-13.8 Deploy a Network Intrusion Prevention Solution CIS Safeguard v8.1
- CIS-16.8 Separate Production and Non-Production Systems CIS Safeguard v8.1
- CIS-4.4 Implement and Manage a Firewall on Servers CIS Safeguard v8.1
- CIS-4.5 Implement and Manage a Firewall on End-User Devices CIS Safeguard v8.1
- CIS-4.6 Securely Manage Enterprise Assets and Software CIS Safeguard v8.1
- NIST-AC-3 Access Enforcement NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CA-7 Continuous Monitoring NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CM-2 Baseline Configuration NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CM-6 Configuration Settings NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CM-7 Least Functionality NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CM-8 System Component Inventory NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SC-23 Session Authenticity NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SC-46 Cross Domain Policy Enforcement NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SC-7 Boundary Protection NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SI-10 Information Input Validation NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SI-15 Information Output Filtering NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SI-3 Malicious Code Protection NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SI-4 System Monitoring NIST 800-53 control
References
- https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/spoof/llmnr/llmnr_response Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer
- https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder GitHub Responder
- https://blog.secureideas.com/2018/04/ever-run-a-relay-why-smb-relays-should-be-on-your-mind.html Secure Ideas SMB Relay
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/d/an-investigation-of-the-blackcat-ransomware.html BlackCat ransomware
- https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc958811.aspx TechNet NetBIOS
- https://github.com/nomex/nbnspoof GitHub NBNSpoof
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6762 mDNS RFC
- https://byt3bl33d3r.github.io/practical-guide-to-ntlm-relaying-in-2017-aka-getting-a-foothold-in-under-5-minutes.html byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link-Local_Multicast_Name_Resolution Wikipedia LLMNR