MITRE ATT&CKsub-technique
T1557.004 Evil Twin
- Domain
- enterprise
- Tactics
- Credential Access, Collection
- Platforms
- Network Devices
- Version
- 1.1
- Created
- 2024-09-17
Description
Adversaries may host seemingly genuine Wi-Fi access points to deceive users into connecting to malicious networks as a way of supporting follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or Input Capture.
By using a Service Set Identifier (SSID) of a legitimate Wi-Fi network, fraudulent Wi-Fi access points may trick devices or users into connecting to malicious Wi-Fi networks. Adversaries may provide a stronger signal strength or block access to Wi-Fi access points to coerce or entice victim devices into connecting to malicious networks. A Wi-Fi Pineapple – a network security auditing and penetration testing tool – may be deployed in Evil Twin attacks for ease of use and broader range. Custom certificates may be used in an attempt to intercept HTTPS traffic.
Similarly, adversaries may also listen for client devices sending probe requests for known or previously connected networks (Preferred Network Lists or PNLs). When a malicious access point receives a probe request, adversaries can respond with the same SSID to imitate the trusted, known network. Victim devices are led to believe the responding access point is from their PNL and initiate a connection to the fraudulent network.
Upon logging into the malicious Wi-Fi access point, a user may be directed to a fake login page or captive portal webpage to capture the victim’s credentials. Once a user is logged into the fraudulent Wi-Fi network, the adversary may able to monitor network activity, manipulate data, or steal additional credentials. Locations with high concentrations of public Wi-Fi access, such as airports, coffee shops, or libraries, may be targets for adversaries to set up illegitimate Wi-Fi access points.
Related
Subtechnique of · MITRE ATT&CK (1)
- T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle technique
Referenced by MITRE ATT&CK · mitigates (2)
Referenced by MITRE ATT&CK · uses (1)
- G0007 APT28 group
Referenced by Compliance · mitigates (18)
- CIS-12.6 Use of Secure Network Management and Communication Protocols CIS Safeguard v8.1
- CIS-13.8 Deploy a Network Intrusion Prevention Solution CIS Safeguard v8.1
- NIST-AC-18 Wireless Access NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-AC-19 Access Control for Mobile Devices NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-AC-3 Access Enforcement NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CA-7 Continuous Monitoring NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CM-2 Baseline Configuration NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CM-6 Configuration Settings NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SC-13 Cryptographic Protection NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SC-23 Session Authenticity NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SC-40 Wireless Link Protection NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SC-46 Cross Domain Policy Enforcement NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SC-7 Boundary Protection NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SI-12 Information Management and Retention NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SI-4 System Monitoring NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity NIST 800-53 control
References
- https://usa.kaspersky.com/resource-center/preemptive-safety/evil-twin-attacks Kaspersky evil twin
- https://kavigihan.medium.com/wireless-security-evil-twin-attack-d3842f4aef59 medium evil twin
- https://posts.specterops.io/modern-wireless-attacks-pt-i-basic-rogue-ap-theory-evil-twin-and-karma-attacks-35a8571550ee specter ops evil twin
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/australian-charged-for-evil-twin-wifi-attack-on-plane/ Australia ‘Evil Twin’