MITRE ATT&CKsub-technique

T1693.002 Module Firmware

Published 2026-04-20 Modified 2026-10-13 Official page ↗
Domain
ics
Tactics
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function, Impair Process Control
Platforms
Embedded
Version
1.0
Created
2026-04-20

Description

Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. This technique is similar to System Firmware, but is conducted on other system components that may not have the same capabilities or level of integrity checking. Although it results in a device re-image, malicious device firmware may provide persistent access to remaining devices. An easy point of access for an adversary is the Ethernet card, which may have its own CPU, RAM, and operating system. The adversary may attack and likely exploit the computer on an Ethernet card. Exploitation of the Ethernet card computer may enable the adversary to accomplish additional attacks, such as the following: • Delayed Attack - The adversary may stage an attack in advance and choose when to launch it, such as at a particularly damaging time. • Brick the Ethernet Card - Malicious firmware may be programmed to result in an Ethernet card failure, requiring a factory return. • Random Attack or Failure - The adversary may load malicious firmware onto multiple field devices. Execution of an attack and the time it occurs is generated by a pseudo-random number generator. • A Field Device Worm - The adversary may choose to identify all field devices of the same model, with the end goal of performing a device-wide compromise. • Attack Other Cards on the Field Device - Although it is not the most important module in a field device, the Ethernet card is most accessible to the adversary and malware. Compromise of the Ethernet card may provide a more direct route to compromising other modules, such as the CPU module.

Related

Subtechnique of · MITRE ATT&CK (1)

  • T1693 Modify Firmware technique

Tactic · MITRE ATT&CK (3)

  • TA0106 Impair Process Control tactic
  • TA0107 Inhibit Response Function tactic
  • TA0110 Persistence tactic

Referenced by MITRE ATT&CK · mitigates (12)

  • M0801 Access Management mitigation
  • M0802 Communication Authenticity mitigation
  • M0804 Human User Authentication mitigation
  • M0808 Encrypt Network Traffic mitigation
  • M0937 Filter Network Traffic mitigation
  • M0941 Encrypt Sensitive Information mitigation
  • M0945 Code Signing mitigation
  • M0946 Boot Integrity mitigation
  • M0947 Audit mitigation
  • M0807 Network Allowlists mitigation
  • M0930 Network Segmentation mitigation
  • M0813 Software Process and Device Authentication mitigation

References