GHSA-3m3q-x3gj-f79x OpenClaw optional voice-call plugin: webhook verification may be bypassed behind certain proxy configurations

• npm @openclaw/voice-call: < 2026.2.3 → fixed in 2026.2.3 • npm @clawdbot/voice-call: <= 2026.1.24 (no fix yet)

Affected Packages / Versions This issue affects the optional voice-call plugin only. It is not enabled by default; it only applies to installations where the plugin is installed and enabled. • Package: `@openclaw/voice-call` • Vulnerable versions: `= 2026.2.3` Legacy package name (if you are still using it): • Package: `@clawdbot/voice-call` • Vulnerable versions: `<= 2026.1.24` • Patched versions: none published under this package name; migrate to `@openclaw/voice-call` Summary In certain reverse-proxy / forwarding setups, webhook verification can be bypassed if untrusted forwarded headers are accepted. Impact An external party may be able to send voice-call webhook requests that are accepted as valid, which can result in spoofed webhook events being processed. Root Cause Some deployments implicitly trusted forwarded headers (for example `Forwarded` / `X-Forwarded-*`) when determining request properties used during webhook verification. If those headers are not overwritten by a trusted proxy, a client can supply them directly and influence verification. Resolution Ignore forwarded headers by default unless explicitly trusted and allowlisted in configuration. Keep any loopback-only development bypass restricted to local development only. Upgrade to a patched version. If you cannot upgrade immediately, strip `Forwarded` and `X-Forwarded-*` headers at the edge so clients cannot supply them directly. Fix Commit(s) • `a749db9820eb6d6224032a5a34223d286d2dcc2f` Credits Thanks `@0x5t` for reporting.