GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Go
GHSA-44xr-mrhh-qm78 Nginx UI: Casdoor SSO callback uses a constant `state` parameter (login CSRF)
HIGH
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-84312
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Packages
- github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
- Severity
- High
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-287, CWE-352
- Reviewed
- 2026-10-15
Affected packages
• Go github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI: < 1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0 → fixed in 1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0
Description
Summary
In the Casdoor SSO flow, the OAuth `state` parameter is hard-coded to `settings.CasdoorSettings.Application` — a value identical for every user and every login. The callback handler accepts whatever `state` the client sends without comparing it to anything stored in the user agent, enabling a login-CSRF: an attacker can force the victim's browser to authenticate as the *attacker*.
Details
`api/user/casdoor.go:92-117` (`GetCasdoorUri`):
```go
func GetCasdoorUri(c *gin.Context) {
clientId := settings.CasdoorSettings.ClientId
redirectUri := settings.CasdoorSettings.RedirectUri
state := settings.CasdoorSettings.Application // ← constant
...
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
"uri": fmt.Sprintf(
"%s/login/oauth/authorize?client_id=%s&response_type=code&redirect_uri=%s&state=%s&scope=read",
endpoint, clientId, encodedRedirectUri, state),
})
}
```
`api/user/casdoor.go:24-90` (`CasdoorCallback`):
```go
type CasdoorLoginUser struct {
Code string `json:"code" binding:"required,max=255"`
State string `json:"state" binding:"required,max=255"`
}
func CasdoorCallback(c *gin.Context) {
var loginUser CasdoorLoginUser
if !cosy.BindAndValid(c, &loginUser) { return }
...
// state is NEVER compared to a per-session value
token, err := casdoorsdk.GetOAuthToken(loginUser.Code, loginUser.State)
...
u, err := user.GetUser(claims.Name) // username from Casdoor's JWT
...
userToken, err := user.GenerateJWT(u) // JWT minted for whatever user came back
}
```
Compare with the OIDC implementation in `api/user/oidc.go:35-48`, which generates a random state, stores it in an `oidc_state` cookie, and validates it on the callback. Casdoor has no such check.
Proof of Concept
1. Attacker initiates a Casdoor authorisation flow on their own browser, obtaining an authorisation `code` for *their* Casdoor account.
2. Attacker hosts a page that auto-submits the captured `code` to the victim's nginx-ui:
```html
","state":"","junk":"' value='"}'>
document.getElementById('x').submit()
```
3. Server exchanges the attacker's `code`, looks up the username from `claims.Name` in the local user table, and mints a JWT for *that* row. The callback also sets the `_nginx_ui_secure_session` cookie via `middleware.EnsureSecureSessionCookie(c)` (`casdoor.go:84`) — meaning the victim is now silently authenticated as the attacker.
4. Victim, believing they are using their own account, configures sites / TLS keys; the attacker reads them.
Impact
Login CSRF — the victim is forced to authenticate as the attacker, leading to data exfiltration of anything the victim subsequently uploads or configures. Particularly dangerous when nginx-ui is used by an organisation where Casdoor maps internal identities — the attacker can attribute their changes to the victim.
Patches
Mirror the OIDC implementation:
```diff
+ import (
+ "crypto/rand"
+ "crypto/subtle"
+ "encoding/hex"
+ ...
+ )
func GetCasdoorUri(c *gin.Context) {
...
• state := settings.CasdoorSettings.Application
+ b := make([]byte, 16)
+ if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
+ cosy.ErrHandler(c, err); return
+ }
+ state := hex.EncodeToString(b)
+ c.SetSameSite(http.SameSiteLaxMode)
+ c.SetCookie("casdoor_state", state, 600, "/", "",
+ cSettings.ServerSettings.EnableHTTPS, true)
...
}
func CasdoorCallback(c *gin.Context) {
+ expected, err := c.Cookie("casdoor_state")
+ if err != nil {
+ c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusBadRequest,
+ gin.H{"message":"missing state cookie"}); return
+ }
var loginUser CasdoorLoginUser
if !cosy.BindAndValid(c, &loginUser) { return }
+ if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(expected), []byte(loginUser.State)) != 1 {
+ c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusBadRequest,
+ gin.H{"message":"invalid state"}); return
+ }
...
}
```
Workarounds
Disable Casdoor SSO until patched. The OIDC integration in `api/user/oidc.go` is correctly implemented and can be used as a substitute.
References
• `api/user/casdoor.go:92-117`
• `api/user/casdoor.go:24-90`
• `api/user/oidc.go:35-48` (correct implementation for comparison)
Credits
Vishal Shukla (@shukla304) and Sechub.dev AI Agent.
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-84312 Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. vulnerability
References
- https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-44xr-mrhh-qm78 web
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84312 advisory
- https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/commit/23d1934099b05b2a01589b48129dc3d3159d91c2 web
- https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui package
- https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.4.1 web