MITRE ATT&CKsub-technique
T1558.003 Kerberoasting
- Domain
- enterprise
- Tactics
- Credential Access
- Platforms
- Windows
- Version
- 1.3
- Created
- 2020-02-11
Description
Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to Brute Force.
Service principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service).
Adversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC). Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline Brute Force attacks that may expose plaintext credentials.
This same behavior could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic.
Cracked hashes may enable Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and Lateral Movement via access to Valid Accounts.
Related
Subtechnique of · MITRE ATT&CK (1)
- T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets technique
Tactic · MITRE ATT&CK (1)
- TA0006 Credential Access tactic
Referenced by MITRE ATT&CK · mitigates (3)
Referenced by MITRE ATT&CK · uses (13)
- G1059 NIMBUS MANTICORE group
- C0049 Leviathan Australian Intrusions campaign
- S1071 Rubeus software (tool)
- C0024 SolarWinds Compromise campaign
- S1063 Brute Ratel C4 software (tool)
- C0014 Operation Wocao campaign
- S0692 SILENTTRINITY software (tool)
- G0119 Indrik Spider group
- G0102 Wizard Spider group
- S0363 Empire software (tool)
- S0357 Impacket software (tool)
- S0194 PowerSploit software (tool)
- G0046 FIN7 group
Referenced by CAPEC · att&ck technique (1)
- CAPEC-509 Kerberoasting attack pattern
Referenced by Compliance · mitigates (19)
- NIST-AC-16 Security and Privacy Attributes NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-AC-17 Remote Access NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-AC-18 Wireless Access NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-AC-19 Access Control for Mobile Devices NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-AC-2 Account Management NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-AC-3 Access Enforcement NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-AC-5 Separation of Duties NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-AC-6 Least Privilege NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CA-7 Continuous Monitoring NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CM-2 Baseline Configuration NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CM-5 Access Restrictions for Change NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-CM-6 Configuration Settings NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-IA-2 Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-IA-5 Authenticator Management NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SC-4 Information in Shared System Resources NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SI-12 Information Management and Retention NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SI-3 Malicious Code Protection NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SI-4 System Monitoring NIST 800-53 control
- NIST-SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity NIST 800-53 control
References
- https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/ Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018
- https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1 Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016
- https://redsiege.com/kerberoast-slides SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293 AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015
- https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spns-setspn-syntax-setspn-exe.aspx Microsoft SetSPN
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677949.aspx Microsoft SPN
- https://blog.harmj0y.net/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/ Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016